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ICA AND THE WRITING REQUIREMENT: FOLLOWING 
MODERN TRENDS TOWARDS LIBERALIZATION OR ARE 
WE STUCK IN 1958?
Article 7 of the Model Law was revised in 2006 to liberalize any requirements 
of form, consistent with modern commercial practices and modern legal trends re
flected in national laws. To the extent adopted by national legislatures, either of the 
two available options under this revision will effectively eliminate any requirement of 
a “record of consent,” thus making arbitration agreements more easily enforceable 
in the adopting jurisdiction. However, any such revision of national laws on arbitra
tion based on the revisions of Article 7 of the Model Law will not necessarily have 
any effect on enforcement of awards in other jurisdictions under the New York Con
vention of 1958. Thus, the revision of the Article 7 of the Model Law presents a very 
real possibility that an arbitral tribunal seated in a jurisdiction adopting these revi
sions may accept jurisdiction over a dispute and render an award that might not be 
enforceable in other jurisdictions because it fails to meet the requirements of Article 
II of the Convention.
In an effort to preempt this issue, in conjunction with its promulgation of the 
2006 revisions of the Model Law, UNCITRAL also adopted a resolution making spe
cific recommendations regarding the interpretation of the Convention. While un
doubtedly of some persuasive value, these recommendations do not, however, carry 
the same force as the actual language of the Convention itself. Thus, the interna
tional commercial arbitration community faces a dilemma. Should national legisla
tures adopt revised Article 7? How should national courts interpret the Convention? 
Should an effort be mounted to draft a parallel convention on enforcement of arbitral 
awards?
This paper addresses these questions by evaluating the revisions of Article 7, 
in the context of the well established principles of competence competence (both 
negative and positive) and separability, and suggests that, perhaps, the limits of Ar
ticle II may be quite appropriate as long as arbitration remains a regime based on 
actual “consent.” However, the paper further suggests that perhaps the normative 
circumstances most frequently advanced in arguing for liberalization of the writing 
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requirement actually dictate that arbitration should today be treated as the default 
regime for resolution of international commercial disputes. The paper concludes with 
a brief discussion of a regime in which international commercial arbitration func
tions as the default, in the absence of any agreement by the parties on dispute resolu
tion.
Key words: International Commercial Arbitration  Writing requirement  Con
sent  Default  Separability  Enforcement
The 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1 [hereinafter Convention] is, by almost 
any measure, an overwhelming success. In 144 countries that are party to 
this Convention, foreign arbitral awards are enforced with relative ease 
and efficiency, subject only to a narrow set of specific and well defined 
exceptions. 2 However, the application of the Convention is limited, un-
der Article II, to “agreements in writing.”3 Article II further defines 
“agreements in writing” in terms of two requirements: (1) a written arbi-
tration agreement—either contained in a broader contract4 or as a stan-
dalone arbitration contract; and (2) a signature or exchange of corre-
spondence.5 The first can be characterized as a requirement of a “record 
of content” and the second as a requirement of a “record of consent.”
Despite its record of success, the Convention has been increasingly 
criticized as outdated and no longer reflective of modern commercial 
practices or modern national laws governing arbitration of commercial 
disputes. During the fifty years since the conception of the Convention, 
arbitration has become far more commonplace—arguably rising in ac-
ceptance from the occasional, to the frequent, and even to the dominant 
method of dispute resolution for parties to international commercial 
agreements.6 As a result, the cautionary and evidentiary functions inher-
ent in Article II appear largely out of place today.7
 1 The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 7 I.L.M. 1042 [hereinafter Convention]. 
 2 See Article V of the Convention. 
 3 While Article VII arguably allows for the application of portions of the Conven
tion, in combination with portions of more liberal national law, see Convention at 3, the 
full application of the Convention alone is so limited.
 4 This broader contract is often called the “container” contract.
 5 Admittedly, some variations of this characterization exist. However, this charac
terization may fairly be characterized as a strong majority approach to interpreting the 
intended effect of the original text. Additionally, the original language was limited to an 
exchange of letters or telegrams, but such terms are almost universally read to include 
most, if not all, forms of modern correspondence.
 6 Admittedly, there is little empirical data on this last point, but the assertion is so 
often made by commentators that it would appear to be accepted as fact today.
 7 Much has been written on this issue, suggesting that the formal writing require
ment is both obsolete and overly burdensome in modern commercial practice. See, e.g., 
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Until quite recently, Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration [hereinafter Model Law]8 mirrored 
Article II of the Convention.9 However, Article 7 of the Model Law was 
revised in 200610 to liberalize any requirements of form, consistent with 
modern commercial practices and resulting legal trends reflected in na-
tional laws.11 To the extent adopted by national legislatures, this revision 
reduces or eliminates existing requirements as to the form of an arbitra-
tion agreement, thus making more arbitration agreements enforceable in 
adopting jurisdictions. However, any such revision of national laws on 
arbitration based on the revisions of Article 7 of the Model Law12 will not 
necessarily effect enforcement of awards in other jurisdictions under the 
Convention. Thus, the revision of the Article 7 of the Model Law presents 
the very real possibility that an arbitral tribunal seated in a jurisdiction 
adopting these revisions may accept jurisdiction over a dispute and render 
an award that ultimately might not be enforceable in other jurisdictions 
because it fails to meet the requirements of Article II of the Convention.
In an effort to preempt this issue, and in conjunction with its prom-
ulgation of the 2006 revisions of the Model Law, UNCITRAL also adopt-
ed a resolution13 making two specific recommendations regarding the in-
terpretation of the Convention. First, the definition in Article II should not 
be read as exhaustive.14 In effect, the listed means of satisfying the writ-
ing requirement should be read as “including, but not limited to . . . .” 
Second, Article VII of the Convention should be given a broad effect 
such that a party can rely on the enforcement provisions of the Conven-
tion in combination with any more liberal requirements as to the form of 
an arbitration agreement provided in the national law of the enforcing 
Janet Walker, “Agreeing to Disagree: Can We Just Have Words? CISG Article 11 and the 
Model Law Writing Requirement”, J. L. & COM. 25/2005, 153, 153 65.
 8 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Model Law on Inter
national Commercial Arbitration § 7 (1985), G.A. Res. 40/72, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, annex 
I (Dec. 11, 1985).
 9 While Model Law Article 7 arguably provided somewhat greater flexibility in 
meeting the requirements for a “record of consent” and a “record of content,” it required 
both, just like Article II of the Convention.
 10 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Model Law on Inter
national Commercial Arbitration § 7 (1985, as amended 2006), G.A. Res. 61/33, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/61/33 (Dec.18 2006) [hereinafter Model Law], at 4 5. Other provisions were 
also revised, including a revision to Article 35 related to the Article 7 revision. Ibid. at 
20 21.
 11 Ibid. at 27 28 (Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat).
 12 Ibid. at 4 5.
 13 Ibid. at 28 29 (Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat), 39 40 (Rec
ommendation regarding the interpretation of Article II).
 14 Model Law, at 39 40 (Recommendation regarding the interpretation of Article 
II).
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country.15 While undoubtedly of some persuasive value, these recommen-
dations do not of course carry the same force as the actual language of the 
Convention itself.
This brings us to the current dilemma faced by the international 
commercial arbitration community. Should national legislatures adopt re-
vised Article 7? How should national courts interpret the Convention? 
Should an effort be mounted to draft a parallel convention on enforce-
ment of arbitral awards?16 In thinking about each of these intimately re-
lated questions, it is useful to consider first the specific provisions of re-
vised Article 7.
Revised Article 7 actually provides two alternative options, and the 
UNCITRAL Secretariat’s Explanatory Notes17 take no position as to 
which might be preferred. Option one essentially eliminates the require-
ment of a “record of consent.” Oral agreements to arbitrate might be fully 
enforceable as long as the remaining requirement of a “record of content” 
is met. Consent need only be proven as required under applicable na-
tional contract law. Option two goes one step further, eliminating both the 
requirement of a “record of consent” and the requirement of a “record of 
content,” and relying on applicable national law for any proof of intent, 
as well as any requirement of definiteness as to content. Interestingly, 
there may be little meaningful difference between the two options in the 
case of an agreement to arbitrate under institutional rules, as the rules 
themselves may meet any requirement under Option one with respect to 
a “record of content.”18 However, the focus of this paper is on the require-
ment of a “record of consent,” which is abandoned in both Option one 
and Option two.
Historically, an agreement to arbitrate a dispute and forego the right 
to resort to national courts was characterized as giving up “one of the 
basic rights of the citizens of any civilized community—that is to say, the 
right to go to their own courts of law” and was further described as “a 
serious step, for which written evidence is needed.”19 However, as arbi-
 15 Ibid.
 16 No one has seriously suggested doing anything to threaten the existing Conven
tion, as its value, as currently drafted, is undisputed. However, a parallel convention, with 
a more liberalized requirement as to form, might be developed with the hopes of eventu
ally rendering the existing Convention obsolete over time.
 17 Model Law, at 27 28. 
 18 The notes from the working group suggest potential contrary views on this, as 
noted in final comments by the Belgian delegation. See U.N. Doc. A/CN/.9/609/Add.3, at 
2 (May 12, 2006). However, the issue is not formally addressed by the Explanatory 
Note.
 19 A. Redfern, M. Hunter, The Law and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration, 1999³. This characterization has been modified somewhat to reflect modern 
practices in the fourth edition.
Annals FLB  Belgrade Law Review, Year LVII, 2009, No. 3
40
tration has increasingly become the most common means of resolving 
international commercial disputes, most have suggested that the need for 
written evidence, or at least some sort of easily accessible record, has 
diminished, and arbitration agreements should be treated just like any 
other contract. This view is essentially adopted by the revisions to Article 
7 of the Model Law. With respect to the issue of consent, agreements to 
arbitrate are treated just like any other contract is treated under applicable 
national law. Of course the logical predicate to such treatment is that, 
with respect to consent, an agreement to arbitrate is just like any other 
contract. But is that true?
Very few other contracts or contractual provisions20 are given any 
degree of effect prior to the determination of their formation or enforcea-
bility—and irrespective of whether or not the parties are found to have 
ever reached an agreement. And yet, arbitration agreements are routinely 
given such effect under the related doctrines of positive competence-com-
petence and separability. In the case of most purported agreements, the 
parties may directly resort to a court to determine whether they are bound. 
Yet in the case of arbitration, the doctrine of negative competence-com-
petence limits the court’s initial review of consent to a “prima facie” de-
termination, leaving any more thorough decisions to any potential action 
to set aside the arbitrators’ decision.21 Moreover, these three doctrines, 
which each give unique and extraordinary effect to an agreement to arbi-
trate, are fundamental to a modern arbitration regime like the Model 
Law.
Article 16 (1) of the Model Law provides arbitrators with the com-
petence to decide their own jurisdiction—often called positive compe-
tence-competence. This principle is very well established in modern arbi-
tration.22 However, it is worth remembering that the doctrine requires one 
to engage in an act of “bootstrapping”23 or to take a “leap of faith” in ef-
fectively granting the arbitrators the authority to “presume” that the par-
ties agreed to arbitration, while actually deciding whether the parties “in 
 20 Choice of law and choice forum provisions may be among the very few excep
tions.
 21 Admittedly, only the doctrine of separability is firmly established under the 
United States Federal Arbitration Act. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. 
Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). However, U.S. law is largely out of step with modern arbitra
tion law with respect to the doctrine of competence competence. See First Options, Inc., 
v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) (explaining that the question of whether the parties agreed 
to arbitrate is one for the court, unless the parties have expressed a “clear and unmistak
able” intent to the contrary). This approach under U.S. law stands in direct contrast to 
Article 16 of the Model Law.
 22 The United States Federal Arbitration Act is of course a notable exception. See 
supra note 35.
 23 One cannot of course lift oneself up by one’s own bootstraps no matter how 
hard one pulls.
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fact” agreed to anything at all. Article 16 also provides for the separabil-
ity of the arbitration agreement, such that the arbitration agreement will 
survive the invalidity of—and perhaps even the failure to form—the con-
tract in which it is contained. While the doctrine of separability is almost 
certainly a practical necessity for any modern arbitration regime, its ap-
plication requires a substantial element of legal fiction. At least one 
prominent commentator has explained that such extraordinary treatment 
of an agreement to arbitrate is justified by the strict form requirements of 
Article II of the Convention.24 In short, the strong requirement of a “record 
of consent” justifies the act of “bootstrapping” necessary for positive 
competence-competence and the legal fiction necessary for separability.
Article 8(1) of the Model Law requires a court to decline jurisdic-
tion in the face of a valid arbitration agreement,25 and the doctrine of 
negative competence-competence provides that this initial court decision 
should be limited to a “prima facie” determination of whether the parties 
agreed to arbitrate—leaving a more thorough examination to any poten-
tial subsequent action to set aside the initial decision by the arbitrators. 
Such a “prima facie” determination is generally quite simple if one re-
quires a “record of consent,” but becomes far more difficult in the ab-
sence of such a record. In fact, in the absence of a clear record, any de-
termination of consent by the court under Article 8(1) might necessarily 
entail a full and complete examination of the issue.26
Without a clear and easily accessible record of consent, how does 
this affect the principles in support of “bootstrapping” or making the ana-
lytical “leap of faith” necessary to justify the jurisdiction of the tribunal 
to decide its own jurisdiction under the doctrine of positive competence-
competence? How does this affect the foundation for the legal fiction 
necessary to invoke the doctrine of separability? How does this affect the 
basis for limiting a court to a “prima facie” determination of whether the 
parties agreed to arbitration under the doctrine of negative competence-
competence? Arguably, the justifications, foundations, and practical ap-
plications of all of these fundamental principles are seriously undermined 
by the elimination of any form requirement with respect to consent to 
arbitrate.
So, does this mean we are “stuck in 1958”? Not necessarily. There 
may be another, simpler, more practical, and more analytically defensible 
approach to bringing the law into conformity with modern commercial 
practice. The movement towards liberalization of the form requirements 
 24 A. van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards a 
Uniform Judicial Interpretation, 1987, 156.
 25 This same provision is found in Convention Article II(3). 
 26 Effectively, this might send all jurisdictional challenges to the court, as is the 
case under the United States Federal Arbitration Act, absent “clear and unmistakable” 
consent to the contrary. See supra note 35.
Annals FLB  Belgrade Law Review, Year LVII, 2009, No. 3
42
is supported, in large part, by the growing predominance of arbitration as 
the preferred means of deciding international commercial disputes. In 
fact, most of the literature suggests that arbitration is the normative de-
fault, as opposed to national court adjudication. If so, why not simply 
recognize arbitration as the legal default rule?
Upon initial consideration, the idea of private arbitration as a de-
fault over national courts might seem extraordinary—or even preposter-
ous.27 In many respects, however, the idea of national adjudicatory mech-
anisms giving way to a private dispute resolution mechanism developed 
through international collaboration is no more revolutionary than national 
substantive laws yielding to a single body of transnational law developed 
through international collaboration. The latter was of course accomplished 
30 years ago with the promulgation of the Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods (the “CISG”).28 Perhaps the time has 
come to give serious consideration to a convention under which interna-
tional commercial transactions would be subject to dispute resolution 
through arbitration—and not national court adjudication—unless the par-
ties have agreed to the contrary, either opting out of the convention or 
specifically choosing a national court to decide their dispute.
With the encouraging prospects for broad acceptance of the new 
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Choice of Court Agree-
ments, it seems that arbitration and national court adjudication agreements 
will be recognized and enforced on relatively equal footing. Thus, it ap-
pears to be a perfect time to revisit the more basic question of which 
should be the default if parties fail to make any effective choice between 
arbitration and national court adjudication. A normative, majoritarian ap-
proach would simply provide a default rule most reflective of actual com-
mercial practice. As such, there is much to recommend a default legal 
rule providing for arbitration of international commercial disputes.
While in some ways this may appear to be a more radical idea than 
the abandonment of form under Model Law Article 7, it is arguably much 
easier to support by reference to basic legal principles. The need for each 
of the extraordinary doctrines discussed earlier arises from the combina-
 27 I first heard this idea expressed by Dr. Eugen Salpius four years ago in a talk he 
gave at my invitation, at Stetson University College of Law. Dr. Salpius was not address
ing the form requirements for arbitration agreements, but was simply suggesting that, at 
some point, the law ought to recognize commercially normative facts, and designate arbi
tration as the default over court adjudication. While I initially found the idea quite inter
esting, I thought it far ahead of its time. However, as a few short years have past, I in
creasingly find the idea less and less extraordinary, and it appears increasingly rational 
and reasonable. See G. Cuniberti, “Beyond Contract  the Case for Default Arbitration in 
International Commercial Disputes”, Fordham International Law Journal 32/2009, 417, 
417 488.
 28 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
G.A. Res. 35/51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/51 (Jan. 1. 1988).
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tion of the facts that (1) arbitration is not the default rule for dispute reso-
lution, but (2) an effective arbitration regime requires the means to avoid 
spending unnecessary time and resources in court before going to arbitra-
tion. If arbitration is the default rule, then the need for competence-com-
petence (negative or positive) or separability is either eliminated or greatly 
diminished.29 Admittedly, these same sorts of issues might arise with the 
choice of a party to go to court, however, it is far more reasonable to apply 
extraordinary rules, along with extraordinary form requirements, to choice 
of court agreements that amount to exceptions to normative practices—as 
compared to our current treatment of arbitration as an “alternative” means 
of dispute resolution. This “exceptional,” rather than “normative,” treat-
ment of arbitration is precisely why the form requirement for arbitration 
has become such a problem over time. Arbitration is treated as an “alterna-
tive,” requiring actual consent, when it is in fact the predominant norma-
tive practice for resolution of international commercial disputes.
The abandonment of the requirement of a “record of consent” at-
tempts to bridge this chasm between the exceptional nature of arbitration 
in 1958 and the normative nature of arbitration today. However, this 
bridge leads only to a legal regime in which arbitration—still an excep-
tional contract giving rise to some very extraordinary legal effects—is 
subject only to very ordinary contractual requirements. It would seem that 
such a bridge risks falling into the very chasm it seeks to span, especially 
when it comes to the application of negative competence-competence in 
a world without any required “record of consent.”
Instead of attempting to “bridge” this chasm, why not simply move 
to the other side and recognize arbitration as the default rule? Legal recog-
nition of this normative fact would dramatically reduce the amount of wast-
ed time in courts attempting to avoid genuine agreements to arbitrate—thus 
eliminating the single most pervasive criticism of arbitration today. While 
the precise details of such a normative arbitration regime are beyond the 
scope of this paper, many potential elements are in place today.
The challenges of a default regime would not likely be any greater 
than those faced when parties agree to arbitrate today, but fail to provide 
any details. This issue can be addressed in a variety of ways through ei-
ther well developed default legal regimes, such as the Model Law, or 
through the designation of default rules. For example, the Inter-American 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration provides, in Article 
3, a default set of rules,30 based largely on the UNCITRAL Rules.31 These 
 29 This might, to some degree, depend on the specific form of a default arbitration 
regime.
 30 Inter American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 
1975, OAS/Ser/A/20 (SEPF), 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975).
 31 UNCITRAL Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec.15 1976).
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rules very effectively address the potential absence of any “record of con-
tent” with respect to arbitral procedures in the event that the parties do 
nothing more than simply agree to arbitrate. This same approach could be 
taken in a convention making arbitration the default rule. If parties then 
failed to cooperate in constituting an arbitral panel, the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration could be employed to designate an appointing authority, as 
is done now in the case of ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL 
Rules.32
It is also worth considering that today relatively few international 
commercial transactions lack any dispute resolution provision. Thus, the 
change of the default rule might not actually change the nature of the ul-
timate dispute resolution mechanism in very many cases. It would, how-
ever, likely add significant efficiencies to the arbitral process and would 
also comport far more with traditional contracts principles than the cur-
rent approach to Article 7, in combination with Articles 8 and 16 of the 
Model Law. Lastly, it is important to remember that parties could always 
opt out—either by simply choosing not to arbitrate, and thereby leaving 
themselves to the vagaries and enforcement risks of unilateral choices of 
national courts, or by agreeing in advance on adjudication by a specific 
court, rather than arbitration.
In conclusion, we can all likely agree that the current requirements 
mandated by a strict interpretation of Article II of the New York Conven-
tion are out of step with modern commercial and arbitral practice. How-
ever, it seems worth considering, at this juncture, whether it is better to 
attempt to build a “bridge”33 from 1958 to the present by abandoning the 
requirement of a “record of consent” or whether it might be more effec-
tive simply to move to the other side of the chasm and designate arbitra-
tion the default mechanism for resolution of international disputes, there-
by avoiding any need for such a bridge.
 32 Ibid.
 33 This characterization as a “bridge” comes from the notes of UNCITRAL Work
ing Group II, which prepared the revisions of Model Law Article 7. See U.N. Doc. A/
CN/.9/WG.II/WP.139, at 5 (January 23 27, 2006).
